Regulatory Common Sense at Last

Nuclear projects in Europe and North America have developed an unenviable reputation for being consistently late and wildly over budget. Given nuclear’s high capital costs, this has deterred private finance in the absence of government support. Today, the UK has become the most expensive place in the world to build nuclear projects. Not ideal when Government’s energy policy makes it clear that an expanded nuclear industry is essential to the electricity sector in the future. 

A key factor in the cost and timescale for new nuclear build has been the regulatory overlay that has ratcheted up since the Three Mile Island accident in the USA in 1979.  The recent Fingleton Review in the UK was tasked to look at this and found “our nuclear regulatory system is unclear, duplicative and does not incentivise the right outcomes”. Complexity, a culture of extreme risk aversion, inflexible process prioritised over outcomes, contribute to a cycle of inefficiency, delay and excessive cost. Operators, supply chain, regulators and government are all part of the systemic failure. The highly concentrated nuclear industry, with weak incentives to cut costs, had developed a culture of complacency with the status quo, a reluctance to challenge regulation creep and an attitude to risk that discouraged innovation.  Group think and gold plating. It is time for an overhaul.  

Fingleton’s Review pulled few punches. Its 47 recommendations set out to restore common sense to the regulatory regime. Rather than tinkering, the Review proposes far more fundamental change. At heart is the concept of proportionality, that is, what is it that is necessary to achieve the nuclear safety goals cost-effectively. That means taking an holistic rather than a silo approach to regulation; driving for clarity, and consistency, on the assessment of the tolerability of risk; and looking for pragmatic approaches to habitat and environmental protection that deliver good outcomes at far less cost. The micro approach to regulation often ignores the trade-offs inherent in giving undue weight to one factor while missing the bigger picture impacts such as the consequences of delay. We are poor at allocating resources to address relative risk objectively. What we are prepared to spend to deliver ALARP (As Low As Reasonably Practicable) in nuclear is a multiple of what we will spend on road safety or health outcomes.  Government should clarify what risk appetite is sensible, mindful of opportunity cost. 

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Regulatory duplication is another target. Multiple regulators review similar issues from different angles that extend timescales and add to costs. Minor changes necessitate repeat assessments to obviate legal challenge. Instead, safety can be enhanced by simpler, transparent processes and a simplified regulatory set up. There should be one lead regulator for each distinct hazard type and a Commission for Nuclear Regulation that can take a proportionate view of competing regulatory priorities. The civil (ONR) and defence (DNSR) nuclear regulators should be combined; and where process drives regulatory requirements delivering minimal benefit, often based on hypothetical or precautionary approaches focused more on “as low as” rather than ” reasonably practicable”, these should be challenged. Streamlined and proportional regulation, focused on optimised outcomes. And nowhere more so than in international harmonisation and joint regulatory working to minimise duplication, avoid unnecessary national adaptation, and deliver fleet benefits. 

And there needs to be a change in culture. The industry, including the regulators, needs to incentivise cost efficiency, innovation (especially the potential of AI and digitalisation), and embrace constructive challenge of status quo acceptance. Siting criteria should reflect the reduced risks of radioactive releases from light water Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) compared to policy devised for the Advanced Gas-cooled Recators (AGRs) decades ago, opening both siting choice and new technology application. Regulators and Duty Holders should review safety cases with an eye on cost benefit analysis and resist creating, or assuming, regulatory expectations that go well beyond either legal requirements or international practice. In the past the industry has been its own worst enemy, assuming regulators might require expensive improvements which the regulators in turn felt should not be refused if volunteered. A new culture on all sides, driving cost effectiveness and fitness for purpose as well as safety, is needed. Old habits die hard and culture change is not easy.

Beyond this the Review tackles simplifying planning processes, limiting or negating frivolous legal challenges, strengthening nuclear skills, encouraging staff retention, and how to drive the implementation of the Review’s recommendations. But perhaps what is most encouraging is the response of the UK Government to the report.  It welcomed the report as soon as it was issued and its detailed response in March 2026 commits to implement most of the recommendations by the end of 2027. In a few areas, it will consider further and consult thoughtfully and in some it plans to go beyond the recommendations to more radical change. But as the Prime Minister’s foreword makes clear, there is wholesale acceptance and a determination to revitalise the sector and regain the nuclear leadership the UK once had. All in all, a proportionate response to a radical review trying to strike the right balance for future success. 

That still leaves the issue of financing!

But it’s a good start. 

Published in May 2026.