For years the energy trilemma has been how to balance climate change objectives, energy security and affordability.
Political will to drive for net zero has faltered of late, as the US has abandoned previous policy goals and oil exporting nations have diluted international consensus and opposed binding commitments. The clear evidence of climate change impacts will force this issue back to the top of the agenda in the future, at greater cost and after greater devastation of coastal populations, famine and migration pressures.
But for now, the third limb of the trilemma is ascendent, as the fragility of energy supply chains is demonstrated daily by the stopping up of Hormuz. The prices and availability of oil, gas and related chemical feedstocks and fertilisers have rocketed. The physical shortage of energy products and specialist fuels is increasingly acute in Asia and areas dependent on exports from the Gulf region, resulting in rationing and industrial disruption. Everywhere, the impact from reduced production and exports from Saudi Arabia, UAE , Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, Oman, Iraq and Iran has driven up energy costs worldwide with longer term consequences for energy intensive industries, escalating supply chain pressures and an energy affordability dilemma hitting the poorest consumers as hard as any. And yet, the old adage that the most expensive energy is the unit not available when it is needed is also proving true.
All of which is driving nations to seek energy independence and energy security. Generally, that comes at a premium but countries formerly addicted to the free market are now willing to pay that price for security, if not stability. So what do the various actors mean by energy security and energy independence, and what exposures do we still face if we achieve independence?
As an island system , the UK has in recent years had to rely on energy imports to power its manufacturing. The heyday of north sea oil and gas which insulated the country from balance of payments shocks, and before that the abundance of domestic coal , have morphed into a dependence on imports of oil, gas and LNG and increased reliance on interconnectors to support our needs in times of low renewables production. But the theory that shortages here will coincide with availability elsewhere of surplus power assumes that the pressures facing disparate systems are not universal and the inclination to prioritise national needs will not prevent flows. Every nation prioritises its own needs. No man is an island may be true for pricing impacts on supplies worldwide , but the same is not necessarily true for the movement of molecules and electrons, however much prices spike.
So energy independence encompasses the concept of adequate domestic capacity to meet our domestic energy needs either for power supply, gas requirements or oil and fuel needs. That can be achieved by adequacy of stockpiled reserves for oil and gas requirements or fuel for thermal generation where local supplies are insufficient; and domestic generation capacity for power needs. In the UK this has been eased by the rapid expansion of wind, solar and other intermittent renewables as well as the resurgence of interest in nuclear and pump storage hydro and the growing battery storage capacity. But while this may address our electricity demand (which accounts for around 21%* of our energy needs) there is no easy fix for hydrocarbon dependence (which accounts for 75%* of our energy requirements). North Sea production is declining at around 9-10% each year and even a change of heart on licencing new fields and wells will, at best, slow that decline. We are today an energy importer by a wide margin; and by international benchmarks , our stockpiles are lamentably low. A legacy of access to north sea sources led to complacency and under-provision of oil and gas storage.
*: Figures are from ‘Dukes 2025’
Energy independence focuses on physical supplies of fuel and power. We remain unshielded from worldwide energy price volatility, …..so having access to the power does not mean it will be cheap. Today, we see the impact of the Gulf conflict on industrial and consumer prices for energy and, indirectly, in the inflation resulting from increased energy costs for goods and services.
This raises the question of whether we can decouple our energy costs from international price pressures in a world where producers want to realise returns and divert supplies to higher value markets or peg pricing to hydrocarbon benchmarks and secure currencies. For those not blessed with surplus domestic energy resources, which applies to the majority of advanced economies outside North America, some exposure is inevitable and stability will depend on contractual mechanisms like CfDs and long term supply arrangements. However, all too often, long term arrangements are pegged oil and gas prices.
Energy security is a wider concept. It covers both the reliability of access to domestic power and fuel,and the reliability and diversity of where imported sources come from. Do our supplies come from stable and reliable partners and are those imports liable to disruption due to political whim or sanctions or physical barriers? Diverse sources can mitigate this risk, but the key question remains whether the supplies will be there when we need them.
Beyond this, it embraces the vulnerability of the supply network to attack and disruption such as the vulnerability of pipelines, sub sea cables or transportation choke points like the Red Sea. As the world hurtles towards competing blocks, scrambling for scarce resources commercially and militarily, and with the weaponisation of energy supply, this becomes a real consideration.
So is energy security a realistic goal? Over time and with strategic planning much can be done. China has invested heavily in renewables and EV transport leadership, battery supply chain and technology as well as nuclear, and is driving down unit costs but it still cannot escape hydrocarbon dependence vulnerabilities today. Domestic clean generation comes at significant up front cost in investment, as most renewables, or hydrogen or nuclear are capital intensive. There is no instant fix; it takes Pounds, planning, and persistent commitment.
Our investment choices are mostly driven by economics, but energy economics depend on what social aspects you price in. Are greenhouse gas emissions valued,penalised, or ignored? Are security and diversity given a value in policy choices and investment appraisals?Building in diversity, redundant capacity and the costly insurance of storage may be at the expense of affordability for consumers and competitiveness for manufacturing. That impacts political stamina. Short term pain for long term gain may not win elections.
But energy security is a strategic government responsibility. Markets may drive down costs but they will not price in social benefits without regulation. The trilemma dilemma is you can often deliver two of the priorities but all three is elusive. Two out of three ain’t bad.
In recent years, we have neglected energy security, focused on other priorities. That choice has come back to bite us. But in an island system like ours, limited and vulnerable connectivity can’t be ignored. Without insurance, you eventually pay an unaffordable price. And just as offshoring our manufacturing on the altar of efficiency has weakened the UK in the long term, so underinvestmentin energy security has made the UK vulnerable. With enemies mapping our pipeline and interconnector routings, in a volatile world where free passage is under threat, the price of not building in robustness has never been greater.
Published in May 2026.